Everyone knows password hygiene remains a challenge for most businesses, but risk in the login journey increasingly extends to the other seams around identity — the moments where users, devices, sessions, and recovery workflows intersect.

The threats include quishing, where a user scans a QR code from an email, webpage, or physical sign and lands on a convincing but malicious login screen. There’s also push fatigue, where attackers bombard a user with approval requests until one gets accepted. And it includes session hijacking and token theft, where the attacker skips the password entirely and hops into an already authenticated session. Add SIM swapping to intercept SMS-based recovery, and the modern login chain starts to look brittle in several different places.

The long-term fix is to move toward phishing-resistant authentication, including FIDO2 security keys and passkeys, backed by enterprise controls that verify context, not just credentials. That means checking device posture, monitoring session behavior, requiring managed devices for sensitive systems, and reauthenticating when risk changes. In short: Don’t just trust the login — trust the device, the session, and the user behavior behind it.

However, if this kind of full passkey rollout is not on the docket yet, there are practical steps organizations can take now to reduce login risk:

  • Turn on number matching for push-based MFA

  • Reduce or eliminate SMS-based authentication where possible

  • Throttle repeated approval prompts

  • Shorten session lifetimes for high-risk apps

  • Require managed-device access for sensitive systems

  • Trigger reauthentication when device posture changes

And meanwhile, employee training should focus on a few clear habits: Don’t scan login QR codes from unsolicited messages or unverified sources, for one, and never approve an unexpected SMS verification push.

To prevent session hijacking, log out of accounts when you finish using them, rather than just closing the browser tab. And avoid public Wi-Fi when you’re doing sensitive things.

And finally, on the SIM-swapping front, switch from SMS MFA to Authenticator Apps that can’t be intercepted via a phone network. You can also request that account changes require physical ID in-store or multilayered, out-of-band authentication before processing SIM changes.

Account takeover attacks are a bugbear that is unlikely to disappear anytime soon, but increasing friction and cost for attackers throughout the login process can really help and, hopefully, get you out of the low-hanging-fruit category at the very least.





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